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Many Americans have lost confidence in their
country’s “energy security” over the past several
years. Because the United States is a net oil
importer, and a substantial one at that, concerns
about energy security naturally raise foreign policy
questions. Some foreign policy analysts fear that
dwindling global oil reserves are increasingly con-
centrated in politically unstable regions, and they
call for increased U.S. efforts to stabilize—or, alter-
natively, democratize—the politically tumultuous
oil-producing regions. Others allege that China is
pursuing a strategy to “lock up” the world’s
remaining oil supplies through long-term pur-
chase agreements and aggressive diplomacy, so
they counsel that the United States outmaneuver
Beijing in the “geopolitics of oil.” Finally, many
analysts suggest that even the “normal” political
disruptions that occasionally occur in oil-produc-
ing regions (e.g., occasional wars and revolutions)
hurt Americans by disrupting supply and creating
price spikes. U.S. military forces, those analysts
claim, are needed to enhance peace and stability in
crucial oil-producing regions, particularly the
Persian Gulf.
Each of those fears about oil supplies is exag-
gerated, and none should be a focus of U.S. foreign
or military policy. “Peak oil” predictions about the
impending decline in global rates of oil production
are based on scant evidence and dubious models of
how the oil market responds to scarcity. In fact,
even though oil supplies will increasingly come
from unstable regions, investment to reduce the
costs of finding and extracting oil is a better
response to that political instability than trying to
fix the political problems of faraway countries.
Furthermore, Chinese efforts to lock up supplies
with long-term contracts will at worst be econom-
ically neutral for the United States and may even be
advantageous. The main danger stemming from
China’s energy policy is that current U.S. fears may
become a self-fulfilling prophecy of Sino-U.S. con-
flict. Finally, political instability in the Persian Gulf
poses surprisingly few energy security dangers, and
U.S. military presence there actually exacerbates
problems rather than helps to solve them.
Our overarching message is simply that market
forces, modified by the cartel behavior of OPEC,
determine most of the key factors that affect oil
supply and prices. The United States does not need
to be militarily active or confrontational to allow
the oil market to function, to allow oil to get to
consumers, or to ensure access in coming decades.
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Introduction
Many Americans have lost confidence in
their country’s “energy security” over the past
several years. Oil prices were already high by
historic standards in 2005 when Hurricane
Katrina ravaged the Gulf Coast and temporar-
ily shut down the refineries, pipelines, and
offload terminals at the large Gulf Coast port
complex, highlighting the apparent vulnera-
bility of U.S. oil infrastructure. Furthermore,
growing chaos in Iraq reminds Americans of
their country’s limited ability to control events
in the oil-rich Persian Gulf region. Finally, the
reliability of even America’s domestic oil sup-
plies was called into question last year when
poor maintenance temporarily closed the
pipelines that carry oil from Alaska to the con-
tiguous 48 states. That a foreign company
(British Petroleum) manages the Alaska
pipeline only reinforced the overarching feel-
ing that the United States has little control
over the energy supplies it vitally needs.
Because the United States is a net oil
importer, and a substantial one at that, con-
cerns about energy security naturally raise for-
eign policy questions. One set of arguments is
based on fears about dwindling global oil
reserves and their increasing concentration in
politically unstable regions. Those so-called
peak oil concerns have led some foreign policy
analysts to call for increased U.S. efforts to sta-
bilize—or, alternatively, democratize—the
politically tumultuous oil-producing regions.
A second concern focuses on the rise of China
and Beijing’s alleged strategy for “locking up”
the world’s remaining oil supplies through
long-term purchase agreements and aggres-
sive diplomacy. According to some analysts,
the United States must respond to China’s
energy policy, outmaneuvering Beijing in the
“geopolitics of oil,” or else U.S. consumers will
find themselves shut out from global energy
markets. Finally, many analysts suggest that
even the “normal” political disruptions that
occasionally occur in oil-producing regions
(e.g., occasional wars and revolutions) hurt
Americans by disrupting supply and creating
price spikes. U.S. military forces, those analysts
claim, are needed to enhance peace and stabil-
ity in crucial oil-producing regions, particular-
ly the Persian Gulf.
Each of those fears about oil supplies is
exaggerated. Peak oil predictions about the
impending decline in global rates of oil pro-
duction are based on scant evidence and dubi-
ous models of how the oil market responds to
scarcity. In fact, even though oil supplies will
increasingly come from unstable regions, the
ongoing investments designed to reduce the
costs of finding and extracting oil are a more
effective response to that political instability
than trying to fix the political problems of far-
away countries. Furthermore, fears of China
are also overstated. Chinese efforts to lock up
supplies with long-term contracts will at worst
be economically neutral for the United States
and may even be advantageous. The main dan-
ger stemming from China’s energy policy is
that current U.S. fears may create a self-fulfill-
ing prophecy of Sino-U.S. conflict. Finally,
political instability in the Persian Gulf poses
surprisingly few energy security dangers, and
the U.S. military presence there actually exac-
erbates problems rather than helps to solve
them.
Those arguments do not mean that the
United States can ignore energy concerns.
Global demand for energy is soaring and
shows no sign of relenting. Furthermore, oil
supplies, though currently abundant, will
eventually begin to run low, and the world will
eventually need to develop other energy
sources. But neither of those problems
requires the sort of activist military policies
that many foreign policy analysts suggest:
specifically, U.S. oil interests do not require the
United States to spread democracy across the
Persian Gulf, confront China, or even main-
tain a peacetime military presence in the
Persian Gulf.
The arguments in this paper do not rest on
the (unreasonable) assumption that countries
always act rationally, or that profit motives
always determine foreign policy choices.1 Our
overarching message is simply that market
forces, modified by the cartel behavior of
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OPEC, determine most of the key factors that
affect oil supply and prices. The United States
does not need to be militarily active or con-
frontational to allow the oil market to func-
tion, to allow oil to get to consumers, and to
ensure access in coming decades.
How Oil Markets Work
Oil markets appear more mysterious than
they are. The details of the oil business are very
complex (e.g., the various grades of oil, the
complex contracts used to buy oil and hedge
against volatility, and the benchmarks that are
used to negotiate prices), but few of those
details matter for a discussion of the links
between oil and foreign policy. Oil companies
care about those details because they are try-
ing to earn a profit on each individual con-
tract, but national policy depends only on the
general availability and overall price of oil.
Because of the market’s complexity, media
accounts often suggest that oil markets move
without a clear connection to economic fun-
damentals and that irrational fears or the
actions of shadowy governments drive price
and product availability. Although con-
sumers’ fears and suppliers’ political decisions
surely matter, their effects can be understood
within a fairly traditional market framework.
Two main processes determine oil prices: (1)
the forces of supply and demand and (2) con-
straints on those forces created by political
risk and cartel behavior.
Market Forces
Geologic features determine the location
and quantity of oil deposits, but they do not
determine “oil supply” in any meaningful
sense. Supply depends on the difficulty (and
hence cost) of oil exploration and production
and on companies’ economic decisions about
how much money to spend looking for new
oil fields, developing pumping capacity from
the fields they find, and filling pipelines with
oil. In any given region, geologic factors, such
as the porosity of the rock, determine whether
meaningful oil deposits exist and how expen-
sive they are to discover and tap. But geology
merely creates the playing field for oil explo-
ration and extraction. The amount of oil that
can actually be “produced” at any given time,
that is, extracted from the ground, transport-
ed to refineries, refined, and then transported
in various forms to end users, depends on how
much money oil companies have invested in a
given field.
Prices drive fluctuations in oil supply.
High prices encourage producers to pump
their working fields at a higher rate to maxi-
mize profits before prices drop; lower prices
lead them to reduce production. And compa-
nies with large inventories of oil generally
respond to high prices by selling their stocks,
unless they expect prices to rise even higher
in the future. Price troughs encourage them
to hold (or expand) their inventories, reduc-
ing supply in the short term.
Similarly, expectations about future petro-
leum prices shape long-term trends in oil sup-
ply. Oil companies, some of which are owned
by the governments of countries with large
reserves, decide how much to invest in explo-
ration, new extraction technologies, and refin-
ing and transportation infrastructure and
whether to pay large up-front costs to tap dif-
ficult-to-reach fields (such as those under
deep water). Those major decisions, far more
than geologic constraints, determine how
much oil can be produced in the coming
decades.2 And in the oil industry like all others,
investment decisions are driven by expecta-
tions about future prices: if the companies
expect oil prices to be high, they will invest
more heavily today since the enormous up-
front expenditures will be recouped by high
per barrel prices in the future.3 But if they
expect prices to be low, they will trim invest-
ment, reducing future supplies.4
Oil prices do not merely affect oil supply;
they also play a key role in determining global
demand. In the short term, demand does not
change much in response to price fluctuations.
People need to drive to work and heat their
houses even if oil prices soar, so they tend to
cut expenses elsewhere rather than go without
oil. But higher prices still reduce long-term
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demand: as prices increase, companies spend
money on more efficient equipment and pro-
duction processes, and individuals buy more
efficient cars and improve the insulation in
their houses. Finally, high prices spur invest-
ment in equipment that uses nonpetroleum
energy sources, reducing the demand for oil.
Although rising prices generally dampen
demand, in the short term climbing prices
may actually spark additional demand. If the
factors pushing up prices seem likely to con-
tinue, then consumers, brokers, and produc-
ers may decide to fill their inventories so that
they can profit from the even higher price
they expect in the future. Such speculation is
the principal mechanism at work when fears
of war or political instability drive up oil
prices.5 But this dynamic occurs only in the
short term: eventually inventories become
full or the price rises sufficiently that specu-
lators start to sell their inventories. Demand
returns to a level commensurate with actual
consumption, and the price is temporarily
depressed because the market draws supply
both from ongoing extraction and from the
excess inventory. Day-to-day prices may
bounce around quite a bit as consumption,
extraction, and inventory strategies adjust,
but that volatility is centered on a price level
determined by “real” supply and demand.6
The overall point is that the oil market has
its idiosyncrasies and arcane details, but it gen-
erally functions like other markets: Rising
prices increase supply, stimulate investment,
and reduce demand. Price fluctuations match
up the amount of supply on the market at any
given time with the amount of demand, such
that there are no “gaps” between supply and
demand on a day-to-day basis.
Political Risk and Cartels
Market forces shape oil prices, but they do
not act alone. More than in most other
industries, political risk tempers companies’
enthusiasm for making expensive invest-
ments because many oil-producing regions
are politically volatile. Will local governments
nationalize companies’ investments or raise
taxes and fees for future extraction? Will ter-
rorists destroy key equipment, or will a war
disrupt the flow of oil to markets? In essence,
companies explore and drill less intensively
in unstable regions than they would other-
wise because the expected costs due to politi-
cal risks must be added to the purely eco-
nomic costs. Companies must expect oil
prices to rise by an extra margin before they
are willing to invest in volatile regions.
Oil companies understand political risk;
they have made their profits by dealing with
political risk for their entire history.7 The big
corporations manage portfolios of invest-
ments in different parts of the world, increas-
ing the likelihood that at least one of their
investments will be affected by political
events at any given time but reducing the
probability that a substantial fraction of
their oil revenue will be disrupted all at once.
Because oil companies’ investments account
for a baseline level of political risk, that base-
line is built into the overall level of today’s
available oil supply.8 But in especially “lucky”
times when little goes wrong politically, an
unexpectedly high level of oil will be available
on world markets, and oil prices may fall;
conversely, in especially “unlucky” times, oil
prices may temporarily rise.
Market adaptations to risk are slightly
more complex than implied by this picture of
portfolio management. A decision by a
nationalist or populist government to raise
taxes on oil extraction or to take over an oil
field will not always disrupt supplies much,
because the oil firm may still continue to
pump despite the higher taxes, and presum-
ably a government that seizes a field does so
with plans to sell the oil. As a result, short-
term world oil supply will not change much in
this scenario.9 However, the risk of national-
ization or ex post facto renegotiation of fees
and taxes depresses investment by interna-
tional oil firms, so an increase in the estimated
level of that risk can have a significant effect
on investment and medium-term supply.10
Similarly, any increase in the expected fre-
quency of physical disruptions at oil facilities,
such as those caused by terrorist attacks or
wars, will depress investment levels.11
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In sum, political risk affects the overall
level and geographic location of investments
in the oil industry, but it does not change the
fundamental supply dynamic: The quantity
of oil available today depends on the invest-
ment decisions made in previous decades.
Future levels of supply hinge on current
investments.
Supply disruptions and political risk are
not the only necessary adjustments to the basic
supply-demand framework in oil markets. The
world’s major oil exporters have formed a car-
tel, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries, to try to affect prices by controlling
supply. The cartel members negotiate agree-
ments to mute the normal, competitive market
pressure to produce up to the point where
price equals marginal cost.12
Although the logic is simple, making a car-
tel work is difficult. First, even monopolists
are uncertain about the actual strength of
demand for their product, and OPEC mem-
bers often disagree about how much to restrict
supply.13 They also often disagree about how
much production to expect from countries
that are not members of the cartel.14 Second,
even if the members can agree about the ideal
level of production, they have to allocate mar-
ket shares among themselves. Huge sums of
money are at stake in this zero-sum negotia-
tion; not surprisingly, agreements are often
hard to reach.15 Finally, even when OPEC
members completely agree about total pro-
duction and the allocation of production quo-
tas, each has a short-term interest in cheating,
because each producer can increase its own
profit by exceeding its quota.16
OPEC’s difficulty managing oil supply
varies depending on political and market
conditions. If investment and production
patterns or political events change the num-
ber of key players in the OPEC negotiations,
the cartel management task will change, too.
Agreements are easier to reach and cheating
is easier to detect and punish if fewer players
are involved.17 Moreover, cartels work better
when the members are willing to sacrifice
some of today’s profits for the long-term
benefits of a strong cartel, and the political
and market conditions in the OPEC member
states determine how much each country will
sacrifice for future gains.18 Each time the
global oil supply-and-demand situation
changes, OPEC members have to adjust their
cartel agreement. Given that before the dis-
ruption the cartel was at least somewhat
effective at increasing profits above the nor-
mal competitive level, most disruptions
should hinder cartel cohesion.19 Each market
disruption is an opportunity for intracartel
conflict, hence an opportunity for the
amount of oil flowing onto world markets to
increase compared to the level that OPEC
had preferred to offer in the past.
Like political risk, cartel behavior does not
change the underlying importance of supply
and demand in oil markets. Political risk and
cartel behavior merely modify the expected
responses across the oil industry to price
changes and to political shocks. Overall, the
framework we have described above for under-
standing the oil industry allows us to assess the
likely effects of important trends—including
the possibility of peak oil, China’s new energy
policy activism, and instability in the Middle
East—on the prices that Americans pay, and
that analysis should inform America’s foreign
policy.
The Perils of Peak Oil
In the past decade, the authors of several
widely read books and articles have raised
alarms about the quantity of the world’s
remaining oil reserves. According to the peak
oil hypothesis, the world has recently passed
an ominous milestone: half of the recoverable
oil has already been consumed, and the rate of
global oil production has therefore begun, or
will soon begin, an irreversible decline.20 The
implication, according to proponents of that
hypothesis, is that in the coming decades oil
prices will soar as supplies dwindle and
demand grows.21 Some observers argue that
the United States should use foreign policy
tools to ensure access to the “American share”
of oil supplies in that difficult environment;22
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others ominously warn that it is exactly that
sort of “mercantilism,” which they view as an
inevitable consequence of passing the oil sup-
ply peak, that will draw the United States into
resource wars.23
The pessimistic claims about peaking oil
supplies should be treated with skepticism.
For decades, analysts have argued that oil sup-
plies were dwindling and that the peak rate of
production would soon been reached. In fact,
the most eminent advocate of that argument
today once predicted that the global produc-
tion peak would occur in 1989, but since then
global crude oil production has grown by 23
percent, and oil supply (crude oil and other
petroleum liquids) has grown by more than 28
percent.24 More telling, the world’s ultimately
recoverable resources (URR) have been growing
over time, largely because many fields contain
substantially more oil than was originally
believed.25
One reason URR are growing despite the
world’s continuing consumption of oil is that
improved technology has allowed a far greater
fraction of reserves to be extracted from oil
fields. In 1980 only 22 percent of the oil in the
average field was recoverable, but with better
extraction technology average recovery is now
up to 35 percent, effectively increasing URR by
more than 50 percent. The results of the grow-
ing URR and recovery rate are striking: in 1972
the “life-index” of global oil reserves, the
length of time that known reserves could sup-
port the current rate of production, was 35
years; in 2003, after 31 more years of accelerat-
ing oil extraction, the life index stood at 40
years.26 In short, no one knows how much oil
is ultimately recoverable from the earth, but
there is no compelling evidence that reserves
are running out or that production is near the
peak.27
Although the simplest version of the peak
oil hypothesis exaggerates the likelihood of
impending oil shortages, there is a subtler cause
for concern that has some merit: the world’s
remaining oil supplies are increasingly concen-
trated in politically unstable regions, particular-
ly the Persian Gulf and Central Asia.28 Fears of
instability in those regions could suppress
investment in exploration and development of
oil fields, which could increase prices.29
Moreover, the pessimists argue, unstable future
oil production could leave the United States
vulnerable to sudden supply shocks.30
Concern about the effect of peak oil on the
geographic concentration of oil supplies has led
foreign policy analysts to advocate costly poli-
cies to attempt to mitigate the instability in key
oil-producing regions. One proposal is for the
United States to do more to police the Persian
Gulf and the oil-producing regions of Central
Asia.31 More ambitious policies would aim at
directly addressing the underlying political
instability. Traditional realpolitik logic might
suggest that the United States should support
authoritarian leaders in oil-producing regions
and even help them to quash unrest, although
that option is rarely expressed openly.32
Alternatively, the United States could sacrifice
the short-term stability provided by regional
dictators in the hope that robust U.S. democra-
cy-promotion efforts might enable peaceful
democratic regimes to provide long-term stabil-
ity.33 All three strategies are based on the view
that the growing concentration of the world’s
oil reserves in unstable regions requires an
enhanced U.S. effort to reduce that instability.
Those foreign policy prescriptions for
responding to instability in oil-producing
regions are unnecessary and unwise.34 If oil
production becomes increasingly concentrat-
ed in politically unstable regions, suppress-
ing investment in the oil industry (raising
prices) and increasing the frequency of sup-
ply disruptions (also raising prices), then pos-
sible policy responses should be evaluated on
the basis of their ability to enhance supply
and reduce price. Using that metric, invest-
ments in oil exploration and extraction tech-
nologies are far more attractive than foreign
policies that support dictators or attempt to
police or democratize violent regions.
Oil industry research and development has
a good track record for increasing oil supplies.
Decades of investment in exploration technol-
ogy have made it easier to find deposits, and
improvements in extraction technologies have
made it possible (and economically feasible) to
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recover oil from locations that were once inac-
cessible, such as under deep water. Improved
extraction technology has also increased the
fraction of the oil that can be recovered from
fields. As a result, the average finding and
development cost of a barrel of oil (adjusted
for inflation) plummeted from $21 in
1979–81 to $6 in 1997–99.35 The steady
stream of technological innovation in the oil
industry explains why URR has grown over
the past half century.
In contrast, past efforts to increase stability
in oil-producing areas by supporting dictators,
policing violent regions, or spreading democ-
racy have a dubious track record. Supporting
dictators requires paying large ethical costs up
front in the hope that those dictators will
retain power and keep the oil flowing. Weighed
against those guaranteed costs, the alleged
benefit of supporting dictators is a gamble.
The dictator might lose power anyway, or
rebels might disrupt the flow of oil despite
American support for the dictator. Even if the
dictator does stay in power, the United States
might need him more than he needs the
United States, meaning that U.S. aid would
free him to cooperate with OPEC to raise oil
prices. If, on the other hand, revolutionaries
seize power, they will blame the United States
for the atrocities they suffered under the old
regime. The United States still pays for its role
in returning the shah of Iran to power in 1953
and for supporting his brutal government for
decades.36 The close American relationship
with the Saudi royal family, accepting the
regime’s authoritarian side, has probably con-
tributed to virulent anti-American Islamic rad-
icalism, too.37
Policing the oil-producing regions using
U.S. military force is an even more suspect
strategy. Policing missions are expensive
because they require enormous force deploy-
ments, which typically number 1 percent of
the policed population.38 Furthermore, effec-
tively policing unfamiliar countries is espe-
cially difficult, because local groups often
embroil the outside power in their complex
ethnic, religious, regional, and personal
antagonisms. Too often third-party “police”
are tricked into settling scores, which esca-
lates instability instead of ameliorating it.39
Efforts to democratize countries or regions
are also a dubious solution. The level of diffi-
culty the United States has faced in Iraq is typ-
ical. In fact, the United States has led 17 efforts
at democratic nation building since 1900. Two
of those cases, Iraq and Afghanistan, are still
under way, though neither appears promising.
Of the other 15 cases, only 4 resulted in democ-
racies lasting 10 years or longer.40 The current
27 percent success rate will drop if Iraq and
Afghanistan continue to spiral downward.
Meanwhile, the democratization process itself
may increase instability that interferes with the
flow of oil, and even a successful democratiza-
tion would not promise a smooth flow of oil: a
democratic oil exporter might well find it in its
national interest to cooperate with OPEC to
keep the price of oil high.
The difficulty of creating stability in oil-
producing regions is even more striking when
compared with the relative ease with which
the market deals with instability and political
risk. Oil companies have access to the normal
array of tools to protect their investments:
diversification and insurance. For example,
because political risk in the Persian Gulf is rel-
atively high, oil companies wisely diversify
their investments across the region as well as
in other oil-producing parts of the world;
through diversification they reduce the proba-
bility that violence or unrest will shut down all
their profitable operations, and they can pay
for the expected costs of localized shutdowns
with their worldwide revenues. Furthermore, a
temporary spike in prices following a supply
disruption in one oil producer increases the
value of undisrupted oil investments, giving
oil firms an especially strong incentive to
diversify their investments globally. Finally, oil
companies can simply take the standard step
for dealing with low-probability, bad-outcome
events: purchase insurance. Insurance and
diversification allow firms to cope with the
effects of instability and to maintain a normal
rate of investment.
In sum, the simple peak oil argument that
suggests that the world is running out of oil is
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unconvincing; oil will remain the foundation of
the global economy for decades to come. As
demand for energy continues to increase, oil
prices will likely rise in the long term, increasing
incentives for new oil exploration, technology
development, energy efficiency, and research on
alternative energy sources. Meanwhile, concen-
tration of oil production in unstable regions
does pose a certain danger, but market process-
es, including diversification of sources of sup-
ply and investment to reduce the economic
costs of finding and extracting oil, respond to
the danger better than ambitious foreign policy
options.
China and the Geopolitics
of Oil
China’s soaring demand for oil is one of
the biggest changes to affect energy markets in
recent times. China’s growing thirst for oil,
part of the broader global surge in energy con-
sumption, will drive up prices, imposing costs
on the U.S. economy.41 Some analysts see an
even graver threat ahead stemming from
Beijing’s energy policy: China is negotiating
preferential long-term purchase agreements
that could deny Americans even the opportu-
nity to bid for some oil.42 Those analysts fear
that competition for oil supplies will lead the
United States and China into a struggle they
describe as “the geopolitics of oil.”43 They
implicitly recommend that the United States
shift its foreign policy to work against the
Chinese strategy—in essence, creating our own
preferential agreements to guarantee U.S.
access to oil and perhaps exclude China.
Fears about the implications of China’s
energy policy are greatly exaggerated. First, on
the demand side, China’s efforts to reach long-
term oil purchase agreements will not affect
aggregate global demand for oil; the prepur-
chase agreements will merely change the pat-
terns of global oil trade (i.e., which specific bar-
rels of oil China consumes) but not the overall
level of consumption. The long-term agree-
ments, therefore, will not significantly affect
oil prices. Second, on the supply side, China’s
leap into the oil exploration and extraction
business will either be economically neutral
for the United States or, if Chinese invest-
ments increase aggregate global supplies, pos-
sibly advantageous to the U.S. economy.
China’s soaring demand for energy, and its
implication for global oil prices, will adversely
affect the United States and all other oil con-
sumers (just as our consumption of oil also
drives up prices). But there is little to fear from
Beijing’s energy policy and no reason for U.S.
policymakers to expect, or initiate, the type of
competition with China that analysts envision
when they describe an international scramble
over the “geopolitics of oil.”
More broadly, U.S. policymakers should
make sure that unwarranted fears that ener-
gy competition will breed a Sino-U.S. conflict
do not become a self-fulfilling prophecy. In
reality, no American interest in oil requires
hostile relations with China.
Until the mid-1990s, China produced
more oil than it consumed; since then, China’s
consumption has greatly outpaced domestic
production. China’s economic growth creates
a voracious appetite for oil, especially because
much of the manufacturing investment that
fuels the Chinese expansion is energy inten-
sive, and Chinese consumers view personal
cars as a symbol of their middle-class status.44
Each unit of Chinese GDP increase therefore
bumps up global energy consumption more
than a comparable GDP increase in many
other countries. Many oil analysts believe that
Chinese demand accounts for a substantial
part of the oil price increase since 2000.45
Meanwhile, as the appeal of communist
ideology has faded, Chinese leaders have
staked their political future on the country’s
economic performance and the ongoing rise
in living standards. As a result, they have used
price controls to insulate domestic con-
sumers and industries from price increases
for petroleum products.46 Protected from ris-
ing prices, Chinese consumers and industries
unabatedly increase their consumption.47
The traditional geopolitics of oil argument
goes like this: without a fundamental shift in
Chinese political strategy, Chinese demand for
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oil may threaten the energy security of other
consuming countries, notably including the
United States. Because the Chinese recognize
their sustained need for oil, the government
encourages companies to sign long-term con-
tracts to buy large quantities of oil from pro-
ducers around the world, allegedly establish-
ing “preferential relationships.”48 They have
also bought access to overseas fields by invest-
ing in established foreign oil companies and
obtaining concessions to develop oil fields and
rights to explore for new fields.49 Those acqui-
sitions give the Chinese decisionmaking con-
trol over future oil supplies.
Meanwhile, Chinese diplomats cultivate
relationships with the governments of coun-
tries with large oil reserves.50 Some analysts
allege that such statecraft is especially helpful
in the oil industry, because government-
owned oil companies control the fields in
many countries, and perhaps those govern-
ments will be persuaded to sell to the Chinese
at below-market prices, especially during an
oil shock.51 And, finally, the Chinese govern-
ment and oil companies are negotiating over-
land pipeline deals to bring oil to China from
Russia, the Caspian basin, and even the
Middle East.52 Other analysts and a number
of American politicians fear that all of those
moves reflect a coherent Chinese national
energy policy, one that might lock up sources
of oil supply, leaving less oil on the world
market for relatively laissez-faire countries
like the United States.53
The economic arguments against those
fears are compelling.54 Whether or not China
arranges its oil purchases years in advance, it
will consume the same amount of oil. If China
buys concessions from foreign governments
to pump oil from their wells or to prospect for
new fields on their territory and then chooses
to ship the crude to Chinese customers rather
than to sell it on the open market, the Chinese
actions will simply free up oil pumped by
other companies so that they can then sell to
non-Chinese consumers.55 In other words, the
Chinese arrangements may lock up supply,
but they also sate a substantial portion of
world demand. Even the Department of
Energy study mandated by Congress in the
wake of the CNOOC affair—a study prompted
by an overwhelming congressional vote to
“protect” American energy security—found
that the consequences of the Chinese oil strat-
egy are “economically neutral.”56
Defenders of the geopolitics of oil argu-
ment attack those rebuttals by questioning a
key assumption of the economic view. They
ask, what if the Chinese government were will-
ing to sacrifice profits to keep oil for the
Chinese market—that is, what if China import-
ed all of the oil from its foreign concessions,
holding down oil prices on the Chinese domes-
tic market, and refused to resell its oil, even if
world market prices soared above the Chinese
domestic price?57 That would reduce the sup-
ply of oil available to non-Chinese consumers,
dramatically driving up oil prices outside
China. Current Chinese price controls on
petroleum products, after all, demonstrate the
Chinese government’s willingness to sacrifice
economic efficiency for noneconomic goals,
such as the political stability that they think
cheap oil enhances.
What the pessimistic analyses overlook,
however, is that a Chinese decision not to resell
the oil China pumps (whether from foreign
concessions or domestic production), despite
the opportunity to make big profits, would be
the same thing as China deciding to pay more
for oil than other consumers.58 In other words,
China’s hypothetical decision not to sell oil to
Americans even if world prices rose dramatical-
ly (e.g., during a supply disruption) would cost
the Chinese the same amount of money that
they could use to outbid Americans in a “free”
oil market in which China had not made long-
term deals with suppliers. The point is that
China’s current activities, whether or not they
are characterized as mercantilist efforts to lock
up oil supplies, make no difference to
Americans’ long-run ability to buy oil in the
market. What might hurt American consumers
is China’s growing demand for oil, because that
demand drives up prices. Chinese ownership of
oil does not matter much.
Some Chinese oil policy initiatives are even
good for U.S. consumers. In recent years,
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Chinese firms have spent billions of dollars to
purchase concessions in Angola, Canada,
Ecuador, Equatorial Guinea, Kazakhstan,
Kenya, Nigeria, and Peru (among others).
Compared to Western oil firms, the Chinese
seem willing to overpay for oil fields.59 Some
areas that the Western firms wouldn’t consid-
er likely to have a high enough return on
investment still attract Chinese drilling. If
those prospects pay off, more oil will enter the
world market, driving down prices for all con-
sumers; if the prospects fail, Chinese rather
than American shareholders will cover the
losses. Meanwhile, American investors can put
their money into other projects (perhaps even
outside the oil industry) that they judge more
likely to be productive.
In sum, China’s oil policy will not hurt the
United States, and it may even benefit the U.S.
economy. China’s prepurchase agreements
mainly move oil around: they alter trade pat-
terns and dictate which specific barrels of oil
arrive at China’s ports; they do not affect the
total amount of oil consumed or the market
price determined by supply and demand.
China may end up being disappointed by its
investments in foreign oil fields: Western
firms may be unwilling to pay as much as
Chinese oil companies to explore and develop
those concessions for good reasons. On the
other hand, if Chinese investors were shrewd
or they simply get lucky and their prospecting
expands the world oil supply, the price of oil
will drop for Americans, too. In effect,
overzealous Chinese exploration could subsi-
dize the rest of the world’s consumers.
But makers of U.S. foreign policy may face
another problem stemming from China’s
growing energy consumption and role in oil
exploration and extraction: those trends may
reduce the effectiveness of U.S. economic
sanctions against oil-producing countries.60
In the past, Western countries could try to
coerce oil-producing nations by prohibiting
Western corporations and citizens from pro-
viding them with critical oil technology or
engineering services. Those prohibitions had
real teeth because the major oil companies
were American or European firms. In the
future, however, as the Chinese gain experi-
ence in the international oil business, coer-
cive efforts will require agreement in Beijing
as well, because Chinese oil companies will be
able to move in and provide services denied
by the West. Similarly, economic sanctions
against oil exporters will be merely symbolic
unless Beijing is on board. China now
imports enough oil to “bust” the sanctions: a
unilateral Chinese decision to import oil
from a sanctions target would probably
involve sufficient volume to use up the tar-
get’s entire export supply, meaning that the
sanctions would have essentially no effect on
their target’s economy. Finally, convincing
Beijing to support economic sanctions will
grow increasingly costly as China’s oil con-
sumption rises: if a U.S.-led embargo triggers
any increase in the global price of oil, China
will pay that premium for each barrel it con-
sumes; China’s growing demand, therefore,
makes it more costly for Beijing to agree to
sanctions, hence more costly for Washington
to induce China to cooperate.
However, concerns that China’s energy
policy could blunt the effectiveness of U.S.
economic sanctions are often exaggerated.
First, to increase the political resonance of
their claims, analysts often link the argument
about economic sanctions to American
“energy security,” even though the issue here
is not the price and availability of energy to
Americans but is instead something quite
different: the effectiveness of one tool of U.S.
foreign policy. The concerns about the future
effectiveness of U.S. economic sanctions do
not suggest any threat to U.S. energy security.
Second, concerns about the future effective-
ness of economic sanctions must be tempered
by the fact that sanctions are not a particularly
effective instrument of foreign policy.61 Eco-
nomic sanctions usually fail. Frequently the
target regime cares more about the issue at
stake (say, regime survival) than about the
greatest possible economic cost that foreign
powers could impose. Furthermore, America’s
efforts to impose effective sanctions often fail
because other countries refuse to sign on to the
sanctions regime, which allows the target to
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simply adjust its trade pattern to mitigate the
pain. And target states are not passive as they
are being sanctioned; they often work to create
and then exploit divisions among the sanc-
tioning states.62 Many factors already make
sanctions a dubious tool of statecraft; adding
one additional hurdle, increased Chinese resis-
tance to cooperating due to China’s demand
for oil, would not lead to an appreciable drop
in sanctions’ effectiveness.
Finally, the United States cannot do very
much to reduce China’s ability to bust oil em-
bargos, and any efforts in this direction would
risk a major deterioration in Sino-U.S. relations.
China’s growing demand for oil is driven pri-
marily by its rapid economic expansion. Even if
Beijing were to eliminate energy subsidies,
China’s economic growth would push its ener-
gy consumption ever higher. The only way for
the United States to stem China’s energy con-
sumption would be to significantly slow
China’s economic growth—a goal that would
trigger enormous bilateral tension and, given
the importance that the Chinese government
attaches to steady economic growth, possibly
war. It would be hard to imagine a more hostile
and provocative U.S. policy toward China.63
Overall, the United States should not
worry that China is locking up oil supplies
with prepurchase agreements or that China
is investing to develop overseas oil reserves.
The real energy “problem” that China poses
for the United States is more quotidian:
Chinese demand for oil is rapidly increas-
ing—in fact, worldwide demand for oil is
rapidly increasing—and that drives up global
prices.64 But because of the flexibility of the
global oil market, there is no reason for the
United States to copy China’s energy policy;
to try to block the development of China’s oil
industry; or, worst of all, to adopt policies to
weaken the Chinese economy.
Oil Shocks and U.S.
Military Policy
In addition to their fears about peak oil and
China’s energy policy, many foreign policy ana-
lysts worry that political disruptions in oil-pro-
ducing regions might impose significant costs
on major oil-consuming countries like the
United States. Wars, terrorism, and revolutions
interfere with oil markets, interrupting sup-
plies and elevating short-term prices.65 As a
result, some analysts suggest that promoting
stability in oil-rich regions is an important U.S.
national interest.66 Given the logic that governs
supply, demand, and investment decisions in
the oil industry, however, concerns about polit-
ical disruptions are exaggerated. Furthermore,
maintaining U.S. military forces in the Persian
Gulf to reduce political instability, a common
proposal from analysts concerned with “energy
security,”67 is unnecessary and would actually
increase the danger of political disruption to
oil markets.
In the five major oil supply shocks caused
by political disruptions in the past 30 years,
market dynamics quickly mitigated the costs
borne by consumers.68 Figure 1 tracks the
decline and recovery of world oil production
in the five cases: (1) the Iranian oil industry
strikes in 1978, (2) the collapse of the Iranian
oil industry in 1979, (3) the start of the Iran-
Iraq war, (4) the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait,
and (5) the 2002–03 strikes in the Venezuelan
oil fields.69
The cases reveal four key findings. First, in
four of the five cases (the exception is the 1979
Iran disruption), major reductions in any
country’s oil production quickly triggered
compensating increases elsewhere.70 In all
cases, the disruption triggered intense efforts
in the disrupted country to restore its out-
put.71 For example, in 1978 strikes in the
Iranian oil industry deprived global markets
of nearly 5 mb/d, which was then more than 4
percent of world production. But the world
responded quickly, and global production had
fully recovered in six months. The outbreak of
the Iran-Iraq war removed 3.4 mb/d of Iranian
and Iraqi oil from global markets (5.8 percent
of global production), but total global supply
did not fall by that full amount. Other pro-
ducers increased their output within the same
month, so net global supply only dropped by
4.2 percent. As adjustment efforts continued,
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the losses to the world market were nearly
replaced in three months and fully replaced in
five.
In the most serious disruption of all,
which stemmed from Iraq’s 1990 invasion of
Kuwait, United Nations sanctions eliminated
5.3 mb/d of Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil from world
markets, a loss of 8.8 percent of world pro-
duction. Again, total world supply did not
drop that far, because other producers quick-
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Figure 1
World Oil Production after Major Disruptions
Note: All data are from the U.S. Department of Energy’s Energy Information Agency. Figures reflect total world
oil production.
ly ramped up their output. One month after
the Iraqi invasion, net world production was
down by 5.9 percent, but a month later it was
short by only 1.7 percent, and two months
after that total global production had fully
recovered. In the most recent case, it took
only three months in 2003 to replace the 2.3
mb/d of Venezuelan production disrupted by
strikes.
Second, in four of five cases (with the
same exception), oil prices either remained
nearly constant or quickly returned to pre-
disruption levels. The 1978 Iranian oil strikes
did not have a significant effect on prices;
they remained in the $27–$28 per barrel level
(in constant 2000 dollars) until the disrup-
tion was resolved.72 The outbreak of the Iran-
Iraq war triggered a jump in oil prices, but
they returned to prewar levels in about 18
months. (Furthermore, during the Iran-Iraq
war, the repeated attacks on shipping during
the “tanker war” phase had no discernible
effect on global prices.) Even after the Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent UN
embargo, oil prices dropped nearly to prewar
levels in eight months. And the Venezuelan
oil strikes caused only a brief spike in oil
prices; within five months prices were back to
their prewar level. Figure 2 shows the increase
in oil prices after each of those disruptions
and their recovery over time.
Third, international oil markets appear
increasingly efficient at replacing disrupted oil
supplies, thereby reducing the duration of
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Figure 2
Price Shocks and Recovery after Major Disruptions
Note: Price changes are measured in real terms. 
price spikes. Figures 1 and 2 show that the
three most recent disruptions required the
least time for markets to adapt—even though
one of those three (the 1990 Gulf War)
involved the greatest immediate shortfall.
Specifically, the invention of new internation-
al financial and investment tools since the
1970s has enabled sophisticated spot and
futures markets for oil, facilitating quick mar-
ket adjustments and allowing producers,
wholesalers, refiners, and major consumers to
smooth risks.73
Finally, the long Iran-Iraq War provides
especially clear evidence about the intracartel
bargaining problems that price spikes trigger.
Five months after the war’s sudden beginning,
worldwide oil production matched prewar lev-
els and then immediately exceeded them;
OPEC proved unable to reverse the sustained
price decline that followed. From 1981 to
1985 Saudi Arabia tried in vain to reestablish
cartel discipline, but as war raged in the Gulf,
as the belligerents pumped oil as quickly as
possible, and as the other OPEC members
chose sides, reaching OPEC agreements that
the cartel members would keep became
impossible. The West enjoyed the benefits of
those disputes in the form of several years of
cheap oil.74
Critics might reply that those examples all
come from a time when oil producers had
slack production capacity, that is, when past
investment in exploration and oil field devel-
opment enabled them to pump more oil than
consumers demanded at the preshock price
level. At present, those critics fear, the increase
in worldwide demand (especially from China
and India) has taken up the slack, so produc-
ers could not increase output, even if a disrup-
tion were to create a price spike.75
That criticism is misguided for three rea-
sons. First, data on slack capacity are notori-
ously unreliable. Slack production capacity is
sometimes reported as a static figure (e.g., 2
mb/d), but any reasonable measure must
report the amount of extra oil that could be
brought online in a given period of time and
at what cost. Such details, unfortunately, are
closely guarded secrets. Although industry
observers can make reasonable estimates of
current production levels—for example, by
counting the number and size of the tankers
that dock at a given oil terminal—they cannot
tell how full producers’ inventories are or
how aggressively the producers are drawing
oil out of underground reservoirs.76 And only
producers can do the advanced scientific
tests to try to determine the maximum flow
rate that a given field can support using cur-
rent technology.
Second, assertions about the lack of slack
oil production capacity are inherently suspect
because members of a cartel, and especially
large cartel leaders, should generally maintain
slack capacity. The entire purpose of a cartel is
to help members produce less than the maxi-
mum amount possible in order to increase
price. Furthermore, the enforcement mecha-
nism that (imperfectly) holds the cartel
together is the threat to respond to cheating
with additional increases in output.77 The
same slack capacity that cartel members need
to keep their partners in line can also be used
to respond to a supply disruption.
Finally, the more the United States relies
on market mechanisms to mitigate disrup-
tions in the oil industry, the greater the
incentive producers will have to create addi-
tional slack capacity. If the odds of supply
disruptions increase, producers will be more
willing to pay to maintain additional slack
capacity so that they can pump more at post-
disruption high prices. Similarly, large oil
companies will maintain larger inventories
because they, too, will want to be positioned
to profit from a spike in prices. The result of
those profit-driven responses is to create the
slack that will mitigate the disruptions.
There is clear evidence that slack capacity and
inventory buildup are driven by expectations
of future disruptions. Whenever political
crises that could affect oil supply loom on
the horizon, wholesalers fill their stocks,
essentially creating slack capacity above the
ground that they hope to sell when supply
drops and prices rise.78
Overall, as the historical cases suggest, mar-
ket responses limit the costs that the United
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States should pay to try to control instability
in oil-producing regions with military force. In
two specific situations, however, the market
adjustment to political disruption would be
painful enough to make energy supply a first-
order national security concern.79 But even in
those scenarios, a peacetime forward military
presence is not the best strategy to protect
American interests.
The first scenario is a large-scale conquest
in the Persian Gulf. One power dominating
the Persian Gulf region would limit market
adaptation, because a regional empire could
lead OPEC more effectively than the current
loose oligopoly and because other oil pro-
ducers would not have enough capacity to
compensate for a reduction in the empire’s
output. The majority of the world’s oil
reserves appear to be located in the Persian
Gulf, close enough together that a regional
empire could, conceivably, seize most of
them. The good news is that the risk of major
conquest in the Persian Gulf is at its lowest
point in decades, and preventing that contin-
gency does not require any peacetime mili-
tary presence in the region.
In the unlikely event that a country seemed
poised to make a bid for regional empire, the
United States could issue a clear deterrent
threat to the aspiring regional hegemon: if you
try to take over your neighbor’s oil, the United
States will make sure you fail. That U.S. threat
should be very credible because the United
States has a powerful interest, as does any
major oil importer, in Persian Gulf oil remain-
ing divided, and that interest is evident to
regional actors.80 Second, if deterrence fails,
the U.S. military could halt an offensive quick-
ly, even if the United States had no peacetime
forces in the region. Destroying armies on the
move is one of the things that the U.S. armed
forces do best.81 For example, an army advanc-
ing down the Saudi coastal highway would be
highly vulnerable to U.S. carrier-based airpow-
er and long-range bombers.
In the second scenario, the global econo-
my and with it American national interests
could be harmed by large-scale instability in
Saudi Arabia: civil disorder could trigger
strikes in the oil industry or attacks on oil
facilities. Although intrastate violence in
another oil producer might temporarily
affect global oil supply, as it did in Venezuela
in 2002–03, other countries could make up
the gap in output. But a major civil war in
Saudi Arabia could disrupt enough of the
world’s oil supply that other producers could
not expand output sufficiently to make up
for the disrupted Saudi share.82 That disrup-
tion would impose a significant cost on the
United States—enough cost that U.S. foreign
policy decisionmakers should consider this
scenario a serious threat.
Whether or not a Saudi civil war would jus-
tify U.S. military intervention, it makes no
sense for the United States to position its mil-
itary in the region before a Saudi civil war
breaks out.83 The forces required for on-the-
ground intervention in a civil war would be
vastly greater, and of a different type, than the
forces that the United States has deployed to
the Persian Gulf during peacetime.84 An oper-
ation designed to pacify and stabilize Saudi
Arabia could be an even greater undertaking
than the deployment of 130,000-plus
infantry-heavy forces in Iraq.85
Even worse, U.S. military presence histori-
cally has been more likely to foment attacks
on pro-American governments than to pre-
vent them, and that problem would presum-
ably be worse if the peacetime deployment
were expanded to make it relevant to the civil
war scenario. For example, the shah of Iran’s
close association with the United States and
the large number of Americans in Iran dur-
ing the shah’s reign contributed to the popu-
larity of his opponents.86 More recently, al-
Qaeda declared war on the House of Saud
because the Saudis invited U.S. military
forces to remain in the kingdom after the
1990–91 Persian Gulf War.87 Not only would
a U.S. military presence in the region be
unhelpful in the event of massive civil unrest,
but the presence might increase the likeli-
hood of that scenario. The bottom line of
this economic, military, and political analysis
is that forward deployment of the American
military in the Persian Gulf region is a poor
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response to the threat of civil war in Saudi
Arabia.
More broadly, market adjustment to polit-
ical shocks makes the magnitude of their cost
to the United States low enough that military
force is unlikely to be a wise policy response.
Even in the few instances in which market
dynamics are likely to be insufficient, peace-
time military deployments will not protect the
United States from the risk and, indeed, may
even increase the risk of an oil market crisis.
The best foreign policy strategy for energy
security is to rely on a combination of the flex-
ibility of markets and over-the-horizon mili-
tary forces, which would be used only under
certain, very narrowly specified conditions.
Conclusion
The coming decades may present serious
energy-related challenges to the world. Global
warming may require collective action on a
global scale to reduce emissions, a daunting
task. Furthermore, even though oil is nowhere
near running out, the world’s growing
demand for energy and the finite nature of the
petroleum reserves suggest that in the long
term petroleum prices will rise. People will
therefore need to develop alternative energy
sources to supplement the energy reaped from
current sources. Dispelling the myths that
make Americans worry about the wrong ener-
gy issues is the first step toward confronting
those real concerns.
The United States does not need an activist
foreign policy to ensure U.S. access to afford-
able energy. There is no need to pacify or
democratize tumultuous oil-producing
regions to ensure that they will sell us their
crude. Large oil firms compensate for the risk
of supply disruptions through diversification
and insurance, which allow them to invest and
provide a steady flow of oil despite periodic dis-
ruptions to particular sources of oil. The
United States also does not need to confront
China because of its energy policy; Beijing’s
efforts will either merely shift around global
consumption or perhaps even expand global
supply (which would benefit all consumers).
And there is no need for U.S. military forces to
maintain peacetime deployments in the
Persian Gulf region to protect America’s access
to oil. At most, U.S. energy interests require an
offshore air and naval presence nearby. Even
imperfect markets like the oil market, threat-
ened by political risk and distorted by cartel
behavior, adapt to disruptions, and the adjust-
ment process reduces the burden on the imper-
fect instruments of statecraft such as military
intervention and peacetime presence.
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